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LETTER
Reply to van Hoorn: Converging lines
of evidence
We agree with the comments by van Hoorn (1) on our critique
(2): testing causal hypotheses about human behavior is a chal-
lenge (1, 3). Making progress requires specifying alternative
hypotheses and then testing these hypotheses using diverse and
converging lines of evidence. We have defended the hypothesis
that social norms, which culturally coevolved with the institutions
of large-scale societies including markets, inﬂuence economic
decision-making. This hypothesis emerged from a larger set that
we developed both at the outset of our project and as we went
along. Our interdisciplinary team’s initial list of hypotheses in-
cluded the idea that experimental games might spark an innate
reciprocity module that would yield little variation across pop-
ulations. We also considered the hypothesis that group-level
differences might result from individual differences in wealth or
income. Nevertheless, what emerged in the data in our ﬁrst
project was (i) substantial variation among 15 populations, (ii)
a strong correlation with market integration, and (iii) little re-
lation to individual-level economic or demographic variables. Not
satisﬁed with our ﬁrst effort, we sampled 10 new populations,
replicated these ﬁndings with improved protocols (developed
based on critiques of the Phase I), and then extended them to two
additional experimental games. Along the way, we have explored
alternative hypotheses using measures of genetic relatedness,
social network position, anonymity manipulations, and framing
tools. To our knowledge, no other existing hypotheses can better
account for the observed patterns of variation.
Several independent lines of evidence converge to support our
hypothesis. First, contrary to other accounts, our approach
requires that people can readily acquire social behavior or moti-
vations toward anonymous others through cultural learning. This
ﬁnding is well-established experimentally for children. Experi-
mental work shows that observing a model behaving altruistically
in a novel situation leads children to behave more altruistically
in the same context. This effect endures weeks later, remains
when the child is alone, and is spontaneously enforced by subjects
on novices (reviewed in ref. 4). Consistent with this ﬁnding, evi-
dence indicates that the prosociality measured in economic games
develops slowly over the ﬁrst three decades of life, not hitting the
adult plateau until the mid-20s (4).
Our approach also predicts that norms should be context-
speciﬁc, and thus, how context matters will often vary among
communities with the local norms. Several studies ﬁnd that
context (or framing) not only matters but matters in different
ways in different places (3). Our analyses and use of framing
techniques conﬁrm this ﬁnding in diverse societies (5). More-
over, work using priming tools has already begun to conﬁrm and
explore the link between markets (priming markets) and pro-
social economic choices (6).
Finally, studies of migration underline the importance of
nongenetic inheritance by showing that the average behavior or
beliefs in the home country (place of emigration) predict the
behavior or beliefs of the migrants’ children and grandchildren.
Economically important effects have emerged for generalized
trust, fertility, loaﬁng, labor participation, and son preferences.
Such evidence challenges hypotheses limited to cost–beneﬁt
calculations, evoked modules, or environmentally cued ontoge-
netic processes. Alternatively, perhaps culture matters.
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